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Abstract 
Fairly recently, a new encryption scheme for audio data encryption has been proposed in [Naskar, 
P.K., et al. Multimed Tools Appl (2019) 78: 25019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11042-019-7696-z]. The 
cryptosystem is based on substitution-permutation encryption structure using DNA encoding at the 
substitution stage, in which the key generation is based on a key chaining algorithm that generates 
new key block for every plain block using a logistic chaotic map. After some several statistical tests 
done by the authors of the scheme, they claimed that their cryptosystem is robust and can resist 
conventional cryptanalysis attacks. Negatively, in this paper we show the opposite: the scheme is 
extremely weak against chosen ciphertext and plaintext attacks thus only two chosen plaintexts of 32 
byte size are sufficient to recover the equivalent key used for encryption. The cryptosystem’s 
shuffling process design is vulnerable which allow us recovering the unknown original plaintext by 
applying repeated encryptions. Our study proves that the scheme is extremely weak and should not be 
used for any information security or cryptographic concern. Lessons learned from this cryptanalytic 
paper are then outlined in order to be considered in further designs and proposals. 
 
Keywords: Cryptanalysis, Audio data security, Chosen plaintext attack, Cycle attack, DNA 
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1. Introduction 
Due to some intrinsic characteristics of multimedia data (videos, audios…) [1], including bulk data 
size, strong correlation between uncompressed neighbor data-units, high presence in real-time systems 
and the necessity for fast processing and transmission [2-3]. Multimedia data processing and 
transmission has become a challenging area of research in order to convoy modern applications 
requirements [4]. Information security and data privacy constitutes a crucial requirement in modern 
network applications and data transmission. Public networks are threatened by several cyber-attacks 
due to the high and random accessibility to computer networks. Multimedia data security as any data 
type security is one of the most important process to handle before establishing any information 
transfer over public networks. The necessity for fast multimedia processing applications that responds 
to real-time requirements makes multimedia application development a hot topic in recent research 
arena [5-9].  
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Cryptography and cryptographic protocols [10] make one basic layer for any data type security, 
cryptography is the art of designing highly secure systems that aims to convert original data from a 
readable state to an unrecognizable form except for entities that own the secret key. Conventional 
cryptosystems has been shown in some related works to be insufficient to respond to all mentioned 
requirements [11]. That’s why designing new cryptosystems with high security and fast processing 
time has become a primordial issue since the beginning of our current century [12-15].  Two of the 
most relevant requirements in modern cryptography are confusion and diffusion depicted by C. 
Shannon in his paper “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems” in 1949 [16]. Confusion refers to 
making the relationship between the key and the ciphertext as complex as possible while diffusion 
refers to the property that the redundancy in the statistics of the plaintext is dissipated in the statistics 
of the ciphertext. It has been observed that chaos theory exhibits similar proprieties as confusion and 
diffusion in cryptology theory [17]. 
Chaos theory is a branch of mathematics studying the strange behaviors of dynamic systems and 
chaotic attractors that has two main characteristics [17]: the sensitivity to initial conditions (small 
changes in initial conditions leads to significantly great changes in the orbit of the strange attractor), 
and ergodicity. Chaos theory has been widely used in designing new cryptosystems [5-8,13-15]. 
Nevertheless, the security level claimed by authors of each proposal is still in doubt until carrying out 
a sound cryptanalytic study on their design [20]. Some of them have been already cryptanalyzed in 
subsequent works [18-19]. As a result, many recommendations and guidelines have been proposed to 
assess some basic level of security in new works [17,21]. 
From multimedia to big data, the need for huge and complex calculation capacity and storage space 
pushes researchers to look up for other computing capabilities [22] and environments that meet all 
requirements for computing-world tendency and modern applications. DNA computing is a rising 
filed of new computing generation which makes use of biochemical reactions techniques to perform 
computations across a medium of biological DNA molecules [23]. DNA computing has three main 
advantages over traditional silicon computing, which are inherited basically from some intrinsic 
characters of DNA molecules: a high degree of parallelism, low energy consumption and a vast 
amount of information storage [24]. 
In [25] a new proposed cryptosystem dedicated especially for audio data security is designed based on 
DNA encoding and the logistic chaotic map. The new proposed system is a block cipher that operates 
on blocks of 32 byte size. It is based on a key chaining algorithm that generates different new key 
block for any plain block. The scheme’s design is based on two main operations: substitution using a 
DNA XOR (exclusive-or) operation, followed by a shuffling process to permute bytes within each 
block. The experimental and statistical tests done by the authors of the scheme shows good 
performances [25]. However, in this paper we scrutinized the new proposed system and we found that 
the scheme has some critical flaws. Exploiting those vulnerabilities allows us to conduct many 
cryptanalytic attacks on the overall system as we will demonstrate in further sections. 
The organization of this paper is as follow: the second section describes the audio data cryptosystem 
under study. Section 3 outlines some vulnerabilities and security flaws found in the scheme, two main 
vulnerabilities are considered as critical flaws and make the system weak under many cryptanalytic 
attacks. In section 4 we illustrate our proposed chosen plaintext attack as well as a small discussion 
about chosen ciphertext attack. In section 5 we illustrate our so called cycle attack which is a 
customized version of chosen plaintext attack that aims to recover the plaintext without doing any 
programming effort and only by exploiting the cryptosystem’s encryption machinery. In section 6 we 
depict some lessons learned from this cryptanalytical paper to avoid designing systems with same 
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vulnerabilities in further proposals. Finally, the section 7 discusses our results and concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Description of the audio data encryption scheme 
The scheme under study [25] is labeled in this paper as DECS-AU scheme (DNA Encoding and 
Chanel Shuffling Audio Encryption scheme). It is based on the logistic chaotic map [26] and DNA 
encoding to handle different operations of the process of encryption as well as decryption. The DECS-
AU is a block cipher that operates on blocks of 32 byte length. In this section we re-describe briefly 
all the process of the encryption operation as detailed in [25] followed by a tiny description of the 
decryption process. DECS-AU could be described in three basic steps, which are: key scheduling and 
chaining, substitution operation and shuffling operation. 
1) Key scheduling and chaining: 
Each single plain block
2
    of 32 byte size is encrypted with a corresponding key    derived 
basically from the previous key block      using the logistic chaotic map Eq. (2). The 
original 32 byte key (the one chosen by the user) is denoted as    (master key) and used to 
generate the first key block    for the encryption of the first plain block   . As mentioned in 
[25], consecutive blocks use definitely distinct keys. The key    is generated using the 
previous generated key      as follow: 
  ( )     .⌊   .    
 ( )      (   )/⌋     /              (1) 
Where   ( ) is the      byte of the key   ,    (     ) function denotes reduction 
modulo 256, the floor function ⌊ ⌋ calculates the greatest integer less than or equal ( ), we 
define     ( ) as:     ( )      ( ) , and we define    as       , finally    is defined 
using the logistic map equation as : 
             (      ) (2) 
Where    is calculated by the following equation: 
   
∑   ( ) (   )     
   
 (3) 
That is, the initial condition    is calculated first from the master key   , and then the 
logistic map with a fixed parameter        is iterated according to the position of the key 
byte. 
The last operation in key scheduling process is to update the generated values according to the 
following updating operation: 
  ( )  {
  ( )        ( )      ( ) 
⌊      ⌋         ( )      ( )
 (4) 
This updating operation ensures that two successive key blocks are byte-wise distinct one 
from another. This key chaining ensures a good diffusion of the master key    along all the 
key-blocks. 
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2) Substitution operation: 
Substitution operation aims to confuse the plaintext
3
 using the key generated at the key 
scheduling stage. Here, the same process for one block is done for every block    of the 
plaintext  . The substitution operation could be described in three steps: 
1) DNA encoding operation: 
Each byte from the block    denoted as   ( ) (the      byte of the plain block   ) is 
encoded into its DNA sequence according to a well-defined rule    calculated as:  
      .⌊   .  
 ( )    (   )/⌋   / (5) 
The encoding map used in [25] is depicted in Table 1. The same process is done to 
encode the entire key    to its corresponding DNA nucleotide sequence. The same rule is 
used to encode the same      byte from both    and   . We denote the encoding 
function that encodes a single byte   according to the rule    as: 
      ( )              *
               + (6) 
Table 1 DNA encoding and decoding map according to the rule type used in [25] 
Rule    A T G C 
     00 11 10 01 
     00 11 01 10 
     11 00 10 01 
     11 00 01 10 
     10 01 00 11 
     10 01 11 00 
     01 10 00 11 
     01 10 11 00 
 
2) DNA XOR operation: 
After the encoding of bytes using DNA encoding rules, DNA XOR operation is carried 
out between block’s DNA codes and key’s DNA codes. In [25] the definition of DNA 
XOR operation is based on the binary XOR operation (bitwise EX-OR operation): for any 
given rule the DNA code for a DNA XOR operation is defined as the DNA encoded bit-
wise XOR operation of the two operands in binary form. Table 2 depicted the DNA XOR 
operation according to the rule     .  
Table 2 DNA XOR operation according to rule 1 [25] 
DNA XOR 
  
A T G C 
A A T G C 
T T A C G 
G G C A T 
C C G T A 
 
3) DNA decoding operation: 
After the calculation of the DNA XOR operation between key entities and block entities, 
the results are decoded back to the binary form according to the same rule used for 
encoding of each byte. The decoding function according to the rule    decodes a 
quadruplet of nucleotides back to a single binary byte   and it is denoted as: 
                                                          
3
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      (        )       *
               + (7) 
The overall substitution process could be formed mathematically as: 
  ( )        .      (  ( ))        (  ( ))/            (8) 
Where   ( ) is the      byte of the      substituted block,        and        are 
previously defined in Eqs. (6) and (7) and  denotes DNA XOR operation. 
3) Shuffling operation: 
The last operation in the encryption process is the shuffling of bytes within each substituted 
block   . The shuffling algorithm calculates shuffling indexes, which is a permutation map for 
each substituted block and it depends on the corresponding key block. Odd indexes are stored 
in one array called right channel    *  ( )      +   
   and even indexes are stored in 
another array called left channel    *  ( )    +   
  . And every byte   (  ( )) is 
swapped with its corresponding byte   (  ( )). The algorithm used to generate the two left 
and right channels is depicted in Fig. 1. The shuffling operation is mathematically equivalent 
to: 
   ( )    ( 
 ) (9) 
Where   ( ) is the      byte of the      cipher block, and  
  is defined as 
    ( )  (10) 
Where   is a bijective function from the set   to   such that           *  +   
   where 
    denotes the concatenation of the the set   and the set  .   is defined as: 
 (  )      (       )       (11) 
According to Kirchhoff’s principle [27], the underlying algorithm and all design of a cryptographic 
system should be known to public and the secrecy of the system must rely only on the secret key. The 
overall encryption process could be formulated mathematically as: 
  ( )         .       (  ( 
 ))         (  ( 
 ))/             (12) 
Where   ( ) is the      byte of the      cipher block, and  
  is defined in Eq. (10). 
The decryption process is done by taking encryption steps in reverse order. Firstly, using the same key 
chaining process to de-shuffle the cipher block, and then de-mask it according to the same substitution 
operation. 
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 1:  INPUT the current 32 element key block array K  
 2:  OUTPUT two arrays of 16 elements Rc and Lc 
 3:  START 
 4:  READ K 
 5:  CREATE array V having size = 32 
 6:  CREATE array Rc having size = 16 
 7:  CREATE array Lc having size = 16 
 8:  SET p1 to 0 
 9:  SET p2 to 0 
10:  FOR each element in K 
11:   REPEAT 
12:    SET t to (element Mod 32) 
13:    INCREMENT element 
14:   UNTIL v[t]=0 
15:   IF (t Mod 2)=0 THEN 
16:    SET Rc[p1] to (t+1) 
17:    INCREMENT p1 
18:   ELSE 
19:    SET Lc[p2] to (t+1) 
20:    INCREMENT p2 
21:   ENDIF 
22:   SET v[t] to 1 
23:  ENDFOR 
24:  STOP 
Fig. 1 Shuffling process indexes generation algorithm 
 
3. Security flaws in DECS-AU scheme 
In this section we outline some critical observed vulnerabilities in the DECS-AU scheme. Some 
vulnerabilities affect directly the overall system’s security, while others are considered as weaknesses 
of design and bad implementation of some ideas and operations, therefore, they could be exploited to 
enhance some attacks or partially reveal some secret parts of data or keys. Our observed security 
flaws are described as follow: 
1) Bad confusion/diffusion [16] resulting from the fact that in key chaining operation only the 
previous key is considered, neither the plain blocks nor the cipher blocks are related to the 
key generation and chaining process. This is a crucial vulnerability in the system, knowing 
only the first key block will immediately allow us to recover any desired key block by 
application of the known algorithm of the key scheduling and chaining operation as described 
in the previous section. This vulnerability opens the door to many cryptanalytic attacks (e.g. 
chosen plaintext attack (Section 4.1), chosen ciphertext attack (Section 4.2), differential attack 
(section 4.1), known plaintext attack …). 
Proposition 1: Since the key blocks in DECS-AU are related only to the previous key block, 
then knowing the first key block    is sufficient to recovering all the keys    used for the 
encryption of any plaintext using the same master key  . 
According to this proposition, we will focus in our attacks to recover only the first key block. 
2) No security effect is added by DNA encoding: DNA computing is a rising field of computing 
where the medium of operations is biological DNA molecules which adds more benefits to 
the world of computing (due to some intrinsic molecule’s characteristics) such that high 
degree of parallelism, low energy consumption and vast storage space [24]. In last years, 
several proposals has been published to implement some computing capabilities using DNA 
strands such that making logic gates [28,29] and implementing arithmetic operations [30,31]. 
However in the DECS-AU scheme, the methodology adopted to encode binary data and 
perform DNA XOR operation is by definition based on binary XOR operation. Thus, DNA 
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operations are no more than just and encoding/decoding operations. The definition of the 
DNA XOR operation as explicitly depicted in [25] could be equivalently formulated for any 
given rule    as: 
      .      (  )        (  )/        (13) 
Where    and    are two bytes. 
From this last equation we can say that the DNA XOR operation as done in [25] is equivalent 
to a simple bitwise EX-OR operation in the binary form (denoted as  ). That is, this 
operation may benefits only from some DNA computing pros including parallelism, vast 
storage space … And no security effect is envisaged to be added by this mean.  
3) Period-2 shuffling map (shuffling an element two times regains its original position): the 
shuffling operation is a permutation process that shuffles bytes inside each substituted block 
  . Generally, the total number of possible permutations for a block of 32 distinct bytes is 
           permutations, and the range of a permutation, which is the smallest integer   
that if the permutation is applied   times the data will regain its initial form (no permutation 
occurred) should be as large as possible and close to  . The algorithm (shown in Fig. 1) used 
by authors of the DECS-AU to generate permutation maps is very weak and all permutations 
generated by the algorithm are of range    . This critical vulnerability makes all the 
permutation maps (that could be considered as permutation keys) a weak keys, and makes the 
overall system weak against cycle attack (to be detailed more in Section 5). 
Proposition 2: the range   of all permutation maps (shuffling) in [25] is      That is, for 
any       ( (  ))    .  In other words, for any block   , the application of only 
shuffling process twice has no effect on the block    . 
Proof:  
Let two elements        , such that  (  )    , we have to prove that  ( (  ))    : 
From Eq. (11) we have: 
 ( (  ))   (  )      (       )  (14) 
And: 
     (       ) (15) 
Thus: 
   (       )     (   (       )       ) 
    (          ) 
    (       ) 
                 
Thus, we have proved that for any given     : 
 ( (  ))     (16) 
This proves the proposition. 
  
4) Fixed   parameter of the chaotic logistic chaotic map: the parameter   of the chaotic logistic 
map is by definition in the range ,   - of real numbers. However, the logistic map exhibits 
chaotic behavior only when the parameter   belongs to some distinct regions within ,   - but 
not all the range. The determination of these chaotic regions needs deep analyzing of the 
bifurcation diagram to exclude all non-chaotic periodic windows. Nevertheless, in [25] only 
one fixed parameter        is used in every call for the chaotic map, which may allow one 
to deduce the value of the initial condition    from any value    of the chaotic map and the 
order of iterations  . 
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5) No padding method is defined for the DECS-AU scheme to adjust the last block to a 32 byte 
block: if the padding of blocks is based on zero padding (use null bytes to pad), then 
information about the last key block will be clearly manifested (in shuffled form) in the last 
cipher block. 
6) The applicability of the DNA XOR operation as defined in [25] is seriously questionable (The 
XOR DNA is dependent on the rule at each operation). DNA XOR gates such as in [29] are 
based on oligonucleotides strands, thus every binary state (0 or 1) is encoded using an 
oligonucleotide strand, which allows making some DNA logic gates.  The feasibility of the 
DNA XOR operation as defined in [25] should be at least simulated. 
 
4. Differential chosen plaintext attack and chosen ciphertext attack 
 
4.1 Differential chosen plaintext attack 
Chosen plaintext attack is an attack in which the attacker gains temporary access to the encryption 
machinery. Thus, he could choose some intentionally made plaintexts and get their corresponding 
ciphertext under some unknown key. The objective of the attack is to recover the key or the 
equivalent key used for encryption. From (Proposition 1), if we recovered the first key block   , all 
subsequent keys could be recovered. In this attack, we will demonstrate that only two chosen 
plaintexts of 32 byte size are sufficient to recover the first key block    and thus recovering the full 
equivalent key used in the encryption process.  
In this section we denote the first plaintext as    and the second plaintext as    both are blocks of 32 
bytes. Their corresponding substituted blocks are denoted as    and    respectively. And their 
corresponding ciphertexts are denoted as    and    respectively. Fig. 2 illustrates a flowchart of our 
proposed differential chosen plaintext attack. Our proposed attack could be described in two main 
steps: 
1) Recovering the shuffle map of the first block: 
In order to recover the shuffle map of the first block, we have to satisfy two conditions:  
i) Make unique identifier for each byte position in the plaintext block 
ii) Cancel out the substitution process, thus            . 
By this mean, we will observe the new position of each byte in the ciphertext which will 
allow us to deduce the shuffling map. In order to achieve that, we will combine a differential 
attack with a chosen plaintext one to cancel out the substitution effect.  
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Fig. 2 General schema of our proposed differential chosen plaintext attack 
The substitution process is based on the DNA XOR operations, and from Eq.(13) we have 
that DNA XOR operation is equivalent to binary bit-wise XOR operation. Let us consider the 
difference between the two ciphertext blocks as: 
 (     )        (17) 
From Eq. (12) we have for          : 
 (     )( )         .       (  ( 
 ))         (  ( 
 ))/        .       (  ( 
 ))         (  ( 
 ))/ (18) 
Where    is defined in Eq. (10).  
Thus, using Eq. (13) we have: 
 (     )( )    ( 
 )   ( 
 )   ( 
 )   ( 
 )    ( 
 )   ( 
 ) (19) 
Thus, we could write the difference in ciphertext blocks in function of the difference in 
plaintext blocks as: 
 (     )( )   (     )( 
 ) (20) 
Where    is defined in Eq. (10). 
In other words, we do cancel out the substitution effect and only shuffling effect remains. By 
this mean, we have satisfied the second condition mentioned in the beginning of this sub-
section and we could easily deduce the permutation map if we choose carefully the two 
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plaintexts    and    to satisfy the first condition in such a way to have unique identifier value 
for each byte in  (     ) plain block. 
One possible proposition is to make the plain blocks difference as: 
 (     )( )                (21) 
The two chosen plaintexts could be chosen as: 
{
  ( )   
  ( )    
                   (22) 
The shuffling map for the first block could be recovered according to Eq. (10) as: 
  *  +   
   * (     )( )+   
      * (     )( )+   
   (23) 
2) Recovering the key block   : 
After the recovery of the shuffling map, the recovery of the key    is quite simple operation. 
From Eqs. (12), (13) and (22) we have: 
  ( )    ( 
 )   ( 
 )      ( 
 )    ( 
 ) (24) 
Thus,    is a shuffled version of the key block   . According to (Proposition 2), we simply 
apply the shuffling map (recovered from the previous step) once on the ciphertext    to 
recover the key block   . Generally according to (Proposition 2) we have: 
  ( )    ( 
 )    ( )    ( 
 ) (25) 
Where    is defined in Eq. (10). 
3) Recovering all key chains: 
After the recovery of the first key block   , and according to (Proposition 1), we use the 
algorithm described in the key scheduling and chaining algorithm from the (Section 2) to 
recover as many key blocks as needed to decrypt any  other plaintext encrypted under the 
same master key  .  
Fig. 3 demonstrates our proposed differential chosen plaintext attack: the time-domain plots of the 
two chosen plaintexts    and    are shown respectively in Fig. 3 (a) and (b) and their corresponding 
ciphertexts time-domain plots are shown respectively in Fig. 3 (c) and (d). The frequency-domain plot 
of the supposed unknown plaintext (a sine wave of frequency        ) is shown in Fig. 3 (e) and 
its corresponding ciphertext’s frequency-domain plot is shown in Fig. 3 (f). All the samples are 
encrypted under the same master-key: 
    *                                                                                               + . 
Note that all keys used in this paper are generated randomly using rand function from octave
4
, and 
that all samples are mono-channel samples that are sampled under a sampling frequency of    
       using 8-bits per sample. The recovered key is used to decrypt the ciphertext which its 
frequency-domain plot is shown in Fig. 3 (f) and the time-domain (portion of it) as well as the 
frequency-domain plots of the recovered plaintext are shown respectively in Fig. 3 (g) and (h). The 
recovered plaintext matches the original one. 
                                                          
4
 Octave freeware under GNU GPL license at: https://gnu.org/software/octave/ 
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Fig. 3 Demonstration of our proposed differential-chosen plaintext attack: (a) time-domain plot of the 
first chosen plaintext (b) time-domain plot of the second chosen plaintext (c) time-domain plot of the 
encrypted first chosen plaintext (d) time-domain plot of the encrypted second chosen plaintext (e) 
frequency-domain plot of the unknown targeted plaintext (f) frequency-domain plot of the encrypted 
unknown targeted plaintext (g) portion of time-domain plot of the recovered plaintext (h) frequency-
domain plot of the recovered plaintext 
4.2 Chosen ciphertext attack 
For a chosen ciphertext attack, only one chosen ciphertext of 32 bytes size is required to directly 
recover the first key block   . The flowchart of our proposed chosen ciphertext attack is illustrated in 
Fig. 4. The chosen cipher block is   * ( )   +   
  , thus shuffling process decryption will not 
affect the cipher block since all bytes are with the same value, thus, the substituted block is itself the 
cipher block:    . 
Then, according to Eqs. (12) and (13) we have: 
 ( )   ( )   ( )                      (26) 
Where   is the corresponding plaintext of the ciphertext  , Thus:  
 ( )    ( )             (27) 
That is, the key block    is manifested directly in the decrypted plaintext  . 
 
Fig. 4 General flowchart of our proposed chosen ciphertext attack 
13 | P a g e  
 
5. Weak keys and cycle attack 
Weak keys are keys that lead to some undesired results (e.g. no or bad encryption, self-decryption…). 
That is, if for example encrypting some plaintext with the same key twice leads to recovering the 
original plaintext, then the key is considered as a weak key. We extend this definition to our proposed 
cycle attack to consider a relatively small number of successive encryptions    . 
Our proposed cycle attack is based on repeating encryptions of a particular unknown plaintext   times 
under the same unknown key  , Fig. 5 shows the general flowchart of our proposed cycle attack. It 
could be seen as a chosen plaintext attack with     chosen plaintext. The cycle attack could success 
(e.g. be feasible) only under weak keys, that’s why for any cryptographic system it is better worth to 
exclude all weak keys from the key space. 
 
Fig. 5 General flowchart of our proposed cycle attack 
From (Proposition 2), we know that the range (cycle) of all shuffling keys is equal to two:    . 
Thus, for any key, if the encryption process is applied twice, the shuffling permutation will be 
canceled. 
Lemma 1: for any even number     , applying   successive DECS-AU encryptions on the same 
plaintext will cancel out the shuffling process effect. 
Proof: trivially proved using (Proposition 2), by applying   ⁄    double encryptions.  
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From Eq. (13), the substitution process is based on XOR operation. Bit-wise XOR operation is 
characterized by the fact that for any byte   we have the following propriety:      . Thus, in 
order to cancel out the effect of XOR operation we have to apply it twice.  
Proposition 3: Under any master key  , the DECS-AU scheme is weak under our described cycle 
attack. And only     application of successive encryptions is sufficient to recover the unknown 
original plaintext. 
Proof:  
Let   be a plain block and   is its corresponding cipher block under some key  ,  ( ) is the      
byte of  , we have to prove that after 4 encryptions we have:   ( )   ( ) where    is the cipher 
block after  -encryptions.  
We have according to Eqs. (12), (13) and (25): 
  (  )   ( )  ( ) (28) 
  ( )    (  )  (  )   ( )  ( )  (  ) (29) 
  (  )    ( )  ( )   ( )  ( )  (  )  ( )   ( )  (  ) (30) 
  ( )    (  )  (  )   ( )  (  )  (  )   ( ) (31) 
That is, we have proved that      wich implies that after 4 encryptions under the DECS-AU 
scheme we will recover the original plain. 
  
To experimentally demonstrate this proposed attack, we consider an unknown plaintext
5
 where both 
time-domain and frequency-domain plots are shown in Fig. 6 (a) and (b) respectively. Fig. 6 (c) and 
(d) represent its time-domain and frequency-domain plots respectively after one encryption. Fig. 6 (e) 
and (f) represent time-domain and frequency-domain plots respectively after two encryptions. Fig. 6 
(g) and (h) represent time-domain and frequency-domain plots respectively after three encryptions. 
And Fig. 6 (i) and (j) shows the time-domain and frequency-domain plots respectively of the 4-th 
encryption operation. As shown, the 4-th encryption returns back to the original plaintext, which 
demonstrates experimentally our described attack. The master key used for these encryptions is: 
   *                                                                                               + 
  
                                                          
5
 The audio sample used for this illustration is available freely under:  
https://archive.codeplex.com/?p=audiotestfiles 
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(d) 
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(g) 
 
(h) 
 
(i) 
 
(j) 
Fig. 6 Demonstration of our proposed cycle attack: (a,c,e,g,i) time-domain plots of the original 
plaintext, its first encryption cipher, its second one, its third one and its fourth one respectively 
(b,d,f,h,j) their corresponding frequency-domain plots respectively 
 
6. Lessons learned and recommendations for further works 
In this section to follow, we outline some lessons learned from this cryptanalytic paper as well as 
some recommendations to be considered in improving the DECS-AU system or in designing another 
similar one. However, the DECS-AU system is considered at this stage to be faulty and with no 
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security level, thus we recommend omitting it and don’t use this system for any security concern. 
Some recommendations for designing similar systems are outlined below: 
1) Make strong confusion/diffusion between key block and plain block chains, thus, it is 
recommended to use some cryptographic modes (e.g. CBC, CFB, OFB …) in order to diffuse 
plain blocks along with both cipher blocks and key blocks. Fig. 7 shows a diagram of CBC 
block chaining mode in which each ciphertext block depends on all previous plaintext blocks 
(IV is an initialization vector used to encrypt the first block) .  
2) Use some existing DNA computing operations, we encourage the use of conventional DNA 
XOR operation as in [29,30]. 
3) Change the shuffling method and use more robust permutation maps. We propose for 
example to generate entirely key dependent permutation maps using other chaotic maps or 
any other methods to generate permutation maps. In addition to that, we recommend the use 
of both intra-block and inter-block permutations. That is, permuting bytes within a block and 
also from block to another one according to some permutation maps. 
4) Use other chaotic maps since logistic map is not recommended for cryptographic use as 
shown in [32]. 
 
Fig. 7 Diagram of CBC cryptographic mode 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the security of a new audio data cryptosystem proposed in [25] based on 
key chaining and DNA encoding. The key chaining algorithm aims to generate a new key block for 
every plain block. This process, as claimed by authors of the scheme in [25], allows enhancing the 
security of the system. Nevertheless, we found that this process has two drawbacks:  the main and the 
first one is depicted in (Section 3, vulnerability (1)) as this process don’t take in consideration neither 
the plain block nor the cipher block to generates new key blocks, which leads to a bad 
confusion/diffusion implementation. The second one is that repeating the overall process of the key 
generation for every single plain block is time consuming. Some other vulnerabilities found in the 
scheme are detailed in (Section 3) including the period-two of the shuffling map which contributes in 
major part, to the deficiency of the system. 
In addition to that, we have mounted three particular attacks (i.e. differential chosen plaintext attack, 
chosen ciphertext attack and cycle attack) to evaluate the system’s security and its robustness. 
Negatively, we have found that the system is not as secure as claimed in [25]. The chosen ciphertext 
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attack is the simplest one since it has lowest time complexity but it requires temporary access to the 
decryption machinery under the targeted key. The two other attacks are both considered as a chosen 
plaintext attack but they differ in some aspects. The first attack named differential chosen plaintext 
attack is actually based on two combined attacks: differential attack and chosen plaintext attack. The 
minimum number of required chosen plaintexts for this proposed attack is two chosen plaintexts. The 
second one called cycle attack is a type of chosen plaintext attack but it do not require any 
intervention from the part of the attacker such that programming new pieces of code, making some 
customized sets of plaintexts or do calculations… all the attacker needs is the temporary access to the 
encryption machinery and the ciphertext to be broken. That is, by re-encrypting any given ciphertext 
three successive encryptions we end up by recovering the original unknown plaintext. If needed, the 
key could be recovered (fully or partially) by applying a known-plaintext attack. 
Our attacks’ demonstrations are shown visually based on time-domain plot, frequency-domain plot or 
both of them. We have chosen to depict the most convenient plot type for every result to shed light 
upon the main differences between results and to be as representative as possible, for example for sine 
waves it is better worth to use frequency-domain plots to visualize the information data. 
Our results show the weakness of the system under study and that it is not recommended for 
cryptographic use and information security. In addition to that, we have detailed our observed 
vulnerabilities and we have addressed some recommendations deduced from this cryptanalytic paper 
to avoid such vulnerabilities in further works.  
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